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Summary
This study of the political and constitutional development of the for-
mer Dutch colonies in the Caribbean concerns its transformation from
a colony into a parliamentary democracy.
An attempt has been made to show what actually happened in
the 'Netherlands Antilles' and what lay underneath the words and
actions of the Antillians and the Dutch who were most instrumental
in determining the course of events. It has, therefore, been necessary
throughout the entire study to relate the political and constitutional
evolution to the economic, sociological and cultural development in
the Antilles, while a historical survey supplies the perspective for
understanding the significance of what took place between 1634 and
1994.
The first chapter provides an explanation of the scientific
foundation and execution of this study, as well as a clarification on
the framework for the historical perspective. The propositions to be
answered by this study were formulated as follows:
1. To what extent did the Dutch colonial government and the
,, constitutional development of the state of the Netherlands
influence the existing constitutional order of the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba?
2. Which influences in the past caused the 'Status Aparte' of
Aruba?
3. Is it possible to draw conclusions from the answers on the
propositions 1 and 2 and to make and present scientifically sound
, * recommendations for a future generally, acceptable constitutional
order of the Kingdom of the Netherlands? , ,.
The constitutional history of the colonies Curacao and dependencies
and Sint Eustatius and dependencies - since 1845 Curacao and
dependencies, and since 1948 the Netherlands Antilles - is discussed
mostly in chronological order.
A division is made according to important constitutional changes.
For better reference the constitutional history of the colony is divided
into certain time intervals which brought considerable constitutional
changes.
Period I deals with the time interval 1634-1792. In 1792 the
government of the West India Company was terminated.
Period II covers the years 1792-1815, in this period the Nether-
lands were moreless under French rule.
Period III includes the years 1815-1828; period IV the years
1828-1845 and period V the years 1845-1865. In these periods the
Dutch State governed the colony and tried to implement another form
-im :*/;> of government in order to decrease the amount of money the Nether-
,ö ;?: ;•;<! lands had to pay in governing the upkeep of the colony. It was
understood that colonies ought to yield a profit. In 1865 Government-
regulations were introduced by law and no longer by a Sovereign
decree.
Uiiu.-s. Period VI covers the years 1865-1936. In 1865 the colony was
^f.-r-u granted a beginning of democracy, this became more evident in the
'• - first real constitution for the Netherlands Antilles in 1936.
'•'" ••' Period VII discusses the years 1936-1950. In this period a
•'-•' parliamentary democracy slowly emerged. In 1951 the Netherlands
L it ;••£=.! Antilles possessed all the outward aspects of a modern democracy.
Period VIII covers the years 1950-1986, when Aruba became
• an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
period IX deals with the years 1986-1993, when the remaining islands
of the Netherlands Antilles were searching for a new constitutional
constellation within the Kingdom. An analysis of every period will
be executed according to the following criteria:
"""'•'" '"-• the influence of the evolution of Dutch government on the
^ •' colonial government;
the evolution of the organs of the state in the Netherlands and
' " its influence on the governmental institutions in the colony and
the practice of the rule of law in the colony;
'•• - the division of power within the state, the influence of the 'Trias
i*•;:;•.'•-. : Politica' on the government of the colony;
' • • ' - the influence of the people on the legislature of the colony;
the influence of human rights on the governement of the colony,
especially on the treatment of slaves;
the distribution of the law in the colony; "^ -'"••"
the impact of slavery, colour differences and class differences
in granting political rights, obligations and privileges to the non-
white inhabitants of the colony.
the influence of the previous criteria on the present constitutional
structure of the Kingdom.
After a historical outline an educated guess is presented on the future
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the reasons for the expected
development. In the colonial era the Dutch presence in the colonies
was very significant. Until 1948 there existed hardly any influence
of the population in the governement of the colony. In the future
Dutch influence might increase again. Not to colonize the former
colonies anew, but to support the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba in
becoming self-sufficient in governing their own territories.
1. The origin of overseas expansion, period I
Period I deals with the interval 1634-1792 when the West India
Company ruled the colonies. Holland ventured to reach the tropical
antipodes not only because their nemesis, Philip II of Spain, annexed
Portugal and forbade the Dutch entry to Lisbon. The United Nether-
lands were a nation of merchants, a brokerage house for northern
Europe, and it wanted to get to the source of tropical wealth itself.
Dutch navigators and traders knew the location of the fabled Indies,
they were well acquainted with Portuguese achievement at sea, and
counted among their members individuals who had worked for the
Portuguese. After 1585 the trade with the west coast of Africa
developed. This was promoted by the fact that a great many business
relations between Portuguese and Dutch traders existed, notably with
regard to the Brazilian trade. The States-General of the Dutch Repub-
lic played an active part in supervising the African and American
trade. Thus in 1614, they issued a 'General Charter', according to
which those discovering new passages, ports, or countries were to
be allowed to profit for from their discoveries for a certain period
of time without competition from other Dutch traders.
During the seventeenth century the Dutch extended their influ-
ence in the Caribbean by means of superior naval strength, use of
armed intervention which was often ruthless, by shrewd politicking
and exploitation of local differences. It became apparent to the Dutch
that al these separate ventures did little to promote welfare. So in
1621 a contract was concluded which in effect merged individual
enterprises into one West India Company, better known under its
Dutch acronym as the VV7C
The framework of the organization and the powers of this body
were broadly analogous with those of the United East India Company
(VOQ established in 1602. The WCwas not an unqualified success.
From the very start the VV7C had to respect all sorts of vested inter-
ests, while at the same time conducting a continuous struggle against
captains and merchants who tried to evade its monopoly.
The trade of the English, the French and the Dutch in the
Caribbean area in the wake of the Spanish, had originally a commer-
cial, but later on also a strategic purpose, namely the interception of
the treasures with which Spain financed her wars against rising new
nations. The Netherlands found a harbour in Curasao which offered
an excellent refuge and which gave the island ideal opportunities for
establishing an emporium for the traffic of slaves and goods. St.
Eustatius was also favourably situated for this purpose. The hunt for
salt, tobacco, and Spanish merchantmen formed the principal attrac-
tion of the islands in the Caribbean Sea. Salt and dyewood from the
islands of the Leeward Group, off the Venezuelan coast, were in great
demand.
The later so-called 'Netherlands Antilles' - consisting of the
islands of Curasao, Aruba and Bonaire (Leeward Group), all lying
off the South American mainland, and to the north the very small
islands of St. Martin (partly French, the Dutch part called Sint
Maarten), St. Eustatius (Statia) and Saba (Windward Group) - had
a central Dutch administration for more than three centuries. Period
I is discussed at the start of chapter II and continues with the periods
II-V.
2. Colonization, periods II-V
Period II discusses the space of time 1792-1815, a time of revolution
and restoration, when the colonies were directly governed by the
Dutch State. The Netherlands endeavoured to reduce the costs of
governing the colonies in this period, however to no avail. In period
III, 1815-1828 the colonies were governed by the King. From 1828
till 1845 (period IV) the colonies, including Suriname were united
under one Governor-General, representing the King, with a view to
reducing the costs of governing them. As this did not work the
colonies were divided again in 1845 and the six Caribbean islands
were joined together in one colony. From the end of the Napoleonic
period until the introduction of the Government-regulations of 1865
constitutional modifications were repeatedly made, among others those
required first for the union of Suriname and the Antilles and in 1845
for their division. Period V concerns the time period 1845-1865.
The second chapter covers the years 1634-1793, 1792-1815,
1815-1828,1828-1845 and 1825-1865. The government of the colony
by means of a Company with limited liability, the West India Compa-
ny (W7Q under the supervision of the Republic of the United Nether-
570. Summary
lands (1634-1792) is considered first. The VWCexercised governmen-
tal authority at the same time. In due course the government of the
State of the Netherlands and the King in the colony is explored. One
may freely state that the inhabitants of the colony did not have any
influence oin the government of the colony. The colony was autocrati-
cally ruled by the officers of the W7C and later on by the representa-
tive of the King. There existed no division in the power of the state
officials. All main legislature was ordained by the Dutch government.
In the colony the Council, fl"e /food van Po/jfie, which made the local
rules, also executed them. In that same capa- city and composition
the Council administered justice. Chapter II deals with the periods
I-V.
3. Slavery and the slave trade
Slavery existed in the Dutch colonies from 1634 till 1863. As this
institution did not very well fit in one period it was decided to
consider slavery separately in chapter III. The implications of slavery
for the colonial society are indeed penetrating. The influence on the
structure of the colonial society was of a very definite nature, slavery
left strong marks on the present society of the Caribbean islands.
Although slavery was a subject regulated by civil law it had an
enormous effect on class relations and therefore was eminent in
structuring constitutional and political relations in the colony. So far
all textbooks on Dutch state- and governmental law utterly ignore
slavery and its aftermath in the former Dutch colonies. An omission
not lightly to be excused, it seems.
Slavery and the slave trade were already well established when
Europeans first called upon Africa to obtain labour necessary to come
into possession of the treasures which the newly discovered land on
the other side of the Atlantic promised to yield. Since then the African
negro, brought over as a slave from his native country, or born in
slavery in the colonies, has during three centuries supplied the
manpower required for the economic development of the new world.
For the Dutch the slave traffic became a no longer generally
despised business, but a very profitable and as soon as they had
acquired important interests in tropical America and had driven the
Portuguese from West-Africa, a very risky one. In the seventeenth
century foreign colonies also depended on Dutch trade and capital for
their supply of slaves and for the disposal of the products procured
by the labour of the blacks.
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Local colonial regulations nor metropolitan legislation could protect
the slaves from harsh treatment and ruthless masters in times when
violence and cruelty were deemed suitable means in maintaining order
and discipline, and in administering criminal justice, also in free
society. The Dutch were not known for their benevolent treatment
of slaves.
In the Netherlands the question of slavery never met with a real
and practical interest of large strata of society. The public at large
was rather indifferent to the case of the slaves. Abolition of slavery
had become necessary after the English had liberated their slaves in
1833 and the French iu 1848, and so hardly anybody in Holland and
even in Suriname dared to declare himself against the principle of
emancipation.
The British and French example were very reluctantly followed. The
Dutch government had made inquiries into the possibilities of emanci-
pation without costs to the State but with a compensation to the
proprietors of plantations. It took the Dutch government ten years to
pass the bill for the emancipation of the slaves.
In the colonial society colour nearly always corresponded with
class and status. This did not change much, although in the course
of time the former colony became a member of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands on equal footing with Holland. How prominent 'colour'
still is, became evident in the riots on Curasao, on May, 30, 1969.
It also became manifest in the struggle for Arubian independence
('autonomy') from Curacao. The Arubians generally mistrusted the
inhabitants of Curasao, because their complexion is darker than most
Arubians who pride themselves on their Indian ancestry. This colour
division, often ignored and officially discarded still rules the relations
between the races and classes to a large extent.
4. Stable colonial government, period VI
Period VI deals with the stabilization of the colonial government
between 1865 and 1936. The Government-regulations of 1865 meant
a modernization of the public institutions. Curacao and dependencies
were granted a nominated ^fo/oma/e 7?aod (Colonial Council). The
Government-regulations were revised several times, the most impor-
tant revision being the adjustment in 1936 by which the influence of
the population on the government proceedings was enhanced.
Since 1865 the colonies had the right of budget which however was
subject to certain restrictions. The most important of these restrictions
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was that if the budget showed a deficit its approval should take place
in the Netherlands.
There was hardly an affair in which the Crown or the Parliament
would not have the last word.
An era of unprecedented prosperity and population growth resulted
from the establishment of oil-refineries on Curacao (1915) and Aruba
(1924). Within three decades after these industries were established,
the population of Curacao doubled and the population of Aruba more
than trebled mainly from the influx of foreign labour. The standard
of living rose to a higher level than on any other West-Indian island;
agriculture always small scale because of arid soil and poor transport,
was mostly abandoned. Considerable modification of the Antilles
social structure resulted from greater prosperity, increased population,
improved educational facilities and social conditions. Aruba and
Curacao became 'boomtown' communities and part of the twentieth
century industrialism, while the presence of great numbers of Europe-
an Dutch and other foreigners disturbed the traditional set social
patterns.
As a result of the introduction of limited suffrage in 1936 for
two thirds of the fifteen seats in the Legislative Council, popular
influence was increased. The Royal Governor retained a wide range
of powers, however, so did the Dutch Crown and parliament, despite
the fact that the Antilles became economically self-supporting in 1929.
The emergence of political parties focussed on personalities rather
than on principles.
Party organization, then as now, has been consistently character-
ized by its looseness. Almost every one of the many political parties
depended for its action on one or a few personalities who appeal to
the voters at election-time, but who are generally too overburdened
with other work to maintain contacts with the electorate at other
times.' Chapter IV analyses period VI (1865-1936). =: ,...,.. ,
5. Decolonization, period VII
Period VII analyses the time between 1936 and 1950, when decoloni-
zation emerged and the former colonies slowly progressed to a status
of equal membership with the Netherlands in the Kingdom. The
influence of the Second World War, in which the West-Indies re-
Kasteel (1956) pp. 325-329.
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mained the only unoccupied part of the Netherlands Kingdom, was
very important for the start of decolonization. Politically, this period
has been increasingly characterized by a widespread desire for
change, partly due to economic factors such as the enormously
increased costs of living, diminished trade because of shipping and
dollarshortages, and the scarcity of labour. Political parties started
agitating for 'autonomy': a wholly elected legislature, universal
suffrage, responsible government and abolishment of the power of
Dutch organs to intervene in internal Antillian affairs. They based
their demands on the promise of Queen Wilhelmina in December
1942 that relations between Holland and its overseas territories would
be altered to a basis of voluntary association and self-government in
internal affairs.
After the Second World War the difficulties in Indonesia ac-
counted for the fact that the introduction of the new jurisdictional
order envisaged in the speech of H.M. the Queen had to be post-
poned. In 1948 several important modifications were introduced into
Government-regulations. A semi-parliamentary responsibility of the
people's representation (Sta/en) to be elected by general suffrage was
created. In the same year a revision of the Constitution of the Nether-
lands was effected which abrogated constitutional objections against
further reforms.
Increased political rivalry between Curasao and Aruba, resulted
in a redistribution of seats in the legislature giving these islands equal
representation despite their disparity in population. The new division
was mainly based on the consideration that both islands were finan-
cially self-supporting. Curacao-voters, however, soon started com-
plaining about their small electoral value in relation to the inhabitants
of the other islands. A round-table conference was held in 1948.
Aruba expressed the wish to be 'independent' of Curacao and to enter
into a direct relation with the Netherlands. In order to meet this wish
as far as might be considered reasonable, extensive and thorough
negotiations took place resulting in a settlement for the Antilles in
which a very large measure of independence within the whole of the
Netherlands Antilles, was granted to each island or " island territory''.
The three smaller islands of the Windward Group were considered
to form one "island territory". The underlying principle was that the
islands would get:
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1. their own organs for their internal affairs,
2. their own finances,
3. a competence of their own.
The reforms of 1948 did not prove to be very satisfactory in practice.
As a result, a second series of reforms occurred in 1950/1951. Fully
responsible government was introduced. Another redistribution of
seats in the legislature followed, granting Curacao additional represen-
tation. The Dutch power to interfere in internal Antillian affairs was
abolished. A foundation for future cooperation between Holland, the
Antilles and Suriname and the provisional regulations of the relation-
ship between these three territories was established. Complete autono-
my in internal affairs was enforced by law in 1951. Island-regulations
were introduced in 1951, granting the islands a territorial autonomy.
Chapter V analyses period VII.
6. Responsible Government, period VIII
Period VIII (1950-1986) deals with the realization of the 1954 King-
dom Charter, incorporating the new structure of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands. In 1952 a Round-Table Conference was necessary to
discuss the final jurisdictional order for the Kingdom. The conference
had to be adjourned because of differences of opinion for which a
solution could not be found at that time. The reforms were completed
with the realization of a Charter (SrataHf) for the Realm, by which
the new jurisdictional order was established in 1954. The Sm/MMf
served as a constitution for a Kingdom consisting at that time of three
'equal' partners, the Netherlands, Suriname and the Netherlands
Antilles, each autonomous in internal affairs. Only defense, interna-
tional relations and a mutual guarantee for democracy and 'decent
government' were defined as Kingdom matters and as such were for
all practical purposes to be dominated by the Dutch administration.
b The Charter sets forth the procedure for the conduct of 'King-
dom-affairs' which are restrictively enumerated. It contains the basic
rights and duties of each of the three autonomous territories and
guarantees of good government, the rule of law and certain fundamen-
tal human rights and duties. Approved by a qualified majority of the
parliaments of each of the three territories, this Charter was pro-
claimed the supreme law of the Kingdom on December 15, 1954.
Each territory, however has its own constitution and its own
jurisdiction. The impression could be created that the Kingdom of the
Netherlands is a federation. This however is not the case as the
Crown can suspend or nullify land or island ordinances and other
resolutions and dispositions in case of contradiction with the interna-
tional law or regulations, with a law or with a royal resolution or with
the general interest of the Kingdom. Each territory has a Legislative
Council, a Council of Ministers, a Judiciary and a Government
Advisory Council. The Netherlands Antilles consist of five island
territories. Each island has its own Island Council, Administrative
Council and a Lt. Governor. The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
(since 1986) each have a Governor appointed by the Crown. The
Governor is the head of state representing the Queen, he also acts as
an organ of the Kingdom watching the general interests of the King-
dom in accordance with the provisions related to his activities and
with due observance of the King's* instructions. The Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba each have a Minister Plenipotentiary in the
Netherlands representing their interests in the Dutch parliament and
the Dutch government. Each territory is independent in looking after
its own interests. Not one of the specific territories constituting the
Kingdom of the Netherlands is the competent instance to maintain
international relations, only the Kingdom has that competence.
Chapter VI also looks into the consequences of responsible govern-
ment. In this chapter period VIII is covered until 1969, the year
general unrest on Curacao changed the political relations within the
Kingdom.
7. Independence granted, but not wanted, period VIII (continued)
Chapter VII relates the political causes and constitutional consequenc-
es of the events that occurred on May 30, 1969. Popular unrest in
Willemstad on Curacao unexpectedly led to rioting and looting. In
accordance with the 1954 Sra/wwr of the Kingdom Dutch marines were
called to reestablish order. As they did, the world press documented
a European military intervention in an 'autonomous' former colony.
Nobody liked this. The Dutch had felt themselves obliged to inter-
vene. Now they were denounced for neo-colonialism. For the next
two decades, 'May 1969' was the main reason for the Netherlands
to insist on independence for the Netherlands Antilles and so the
Dutch were unwillingly reinforcing centrifugal tendencies that were
leading to a breakup of the six-island state, which at all costs the
Netherlands wanted to keep together. Mainly for ideological reasons
* For King can be read Crown, this is a modernized description more fitting in the
present parliamentary system in Western Europe.
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successive Dutch governments tried hard to shed the former Dutch
Caribbean colonies, which should become independent long before
the end of this millennium. Linked to this interpretation was the
conviction that the Dutch would impose 'voluntary' independence on
these islands, just as they had done on Suriname. Suriname became
independent in 1975, the post-independence history of Suriname is
not encouraging.
The government of the Netherlands Antilles had a different
attitude. Self-determination according to the Antillians could very well
signify the deliberate choice not to attain full independence. This
means that the Kingdom relations as defined in the 1954 StataKf
should be considered as enduring, unless all partners involved opted
for a change of the status quo. Chapter VII analyses the Antillian and
Dutch opinions on independence (period VIII till 1986).
8. Aruba's struggle for 'autonomy' within the Kingdom, period
VIII (continued)
No matter how sound the formal construction of the Dutch Kingdom
may have seemed at that time, it did not ameliorate the underlying
insular animosities in the Netherlands Antilles, existing since the
1930s. On the contrary the issue of Aruba's place in the Kingdom
reemerged at the outset of the 1970s with more vigor than before.
Next to Curacao, Aruba is the most densely populated island. The
Aruba issue essentially stemmed from the combination of a deep fear
of political domination by Cura?ao and of the consequences emanating
from the emancipation of the black proletariat in Curacao.
Since the 1930s the political elite of Aruba had strongly feared
that any constitutional arrangement with Curacao would de facto entail
political domination by Curacao, because of the latter's larger popula-
tion. The frustrations stemming from the bureaucratic, centralized
structure in Curacao, which was inherited from the direct government
by the metropolis before 1954 bolstered this perception.
The economic development process in the Antilles, especially
since the end of the 1960s, had highlighted the tierce competition
between Aruba and Curacao, to the point that the existing conviction
in Aruba still holds the progress of the islands to be mutually exclu-
sive. Also the social tensions that erupted in Curacao, particularly
after May 1969, had un unsettling effect in Aruba, causing fear that
these tensions could have spillover effects adversely influencing its
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moderately blossoming economy.*
Since the early 1970s Aruba engaged in a struggle against the
federal government which, after sixteen years, on the first of January
1986, resulted in the so called 'Status Aparte', which granted Aruba
a modified independent status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
This status stipulates that Aruba is no longer part of the Netherlands
Antilles but is granted prerogatives within the Kingdom identical to
those of the Antilles. This Status was achieved on the condition,
imposed by the Netherlands, that Aruba would become independent
in 1996. Since the 'Status Aparte' of Aruba, the three partners in the
Kingdom are: the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.
Chapter VIII deals with period VIII (1950-1986) till the 'Status
Aparte' for Aruba was obtained. This chapter analyses the Arubian
opinion on the subject of an autonomous status within the Antillian
constitutional context.
9. Readjustment of the structure of the Kingdom after the 'Status
Aparte', period IX
As a kind of penalty for their splitting the six-island state, the Arabi-
ans grudgingly had to accept another amendment to the StotfKMf: their
full independence as of January 1, 1996. This package deal was
resented by the Arabians and as soon as the separation of the Curacao
dominated Netherlands Antilles had materialized, Arabian politicians
started to militate against the second phase of the convenant. Unlike
the Netherlands Antillian juridical position, the Arabian position was
disputable at best. The fact that in 1990 the Dutch administration
declared its willingness to postpone Arabian independence for an
indefinite time was a clear indication of the change in Dutch policy
regarding its Caribbean legacy.
In the first few years after Aruba gained its separate status a
certain amount of tension could be observed between that member-
Country and the Antilles, in particular in the field of civil aviation
policy. Mutual relations have improved since then. The judicial
cooperation between the Antilles and Aruba is working well. The
collaboration on the drafting of uniform legislation for the two
countries has not procured any legislation so far.
It cannot be said that the federation of the Netherlands Antilles
has become more balanced now that Aruba has left. Referring to their
' Croes and Moenir Alam (1990).
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right of self-determination confirmed at the 1983 Round Table
Conference, various islands (mainly St. Maarten and Curasao) have
since then considered it necessary to raise the question of their future
constitutional structure. New constitutional arrangements between the
islands seem to be urgently needed. Since Aruba left the Antillian
constellation the remaining islands have proposed all kinds of mutual
relations, but so far they could not agree on any of them. The islands
did not want to become independent.
The Antilles, a self-determining partner within the Kingdom,
still feels that full independence is not an attractive alternative to the
present situation, at least not until the islands state has attained a
higher level of viability. With regard to international law, in particular
from the viewpoint of the right of self-determination, at present the
conclusion can be drawn that independence is not the only option open
to non-self governing and other dependent territories. Although the
famous United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Decoloni-
zation in 1960 was based on the idea of independence as the obvious
outcome, if not the only goal, of the right to self-determination, later
resolutions have abandoned this idea. A dependent territory can also
attain full self-government by means of free association or integration
with an independent State. The emphasis is on the free choice of the
peoples concerned.
Since the Dutch have yielded to the issues of independence and
the fragmentation of the Netherlands Antilles, they claim a stronger
say in Antillian and Arubian affairs. In his 1990 'Sc/jett', minister
Hirsch Ballin linked the (indefinite) postponement of independence
to firm regulations which should impede further changes of the status
quo within the Kingdom. Any partner should be either in or out. This
'take it or leave it' approach suggests that the Dutch are willing to
make considerable concessions, but will not refrain from imposing
restrictions. This will lead to a reduction of the Antillian and Arubian
autonomy within the Kingdom. Considering the outcome of the first
conference on the future of the Kingdom in March 1993 and the
contents of the aide-memoire of June 1993 in preparation of the
second conference, this regulations and restrictions on autonomy are
mandatory conditions for a restruction of the Kingdom.
On the first conference all Antillian islands were granted a
separate status, much to their surprise. However, it became clear that
very specific restrictions would be imposed by the Dutch government
before the desired new structure within the Kingdom could be ob-
tained. The imposition of this restructuring of the former Netherlands
Antilles would imply a rather authoritarian start of the new Sro/HM/
period. Such a start would clearly qualify the pious statement in the
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to 'take the wishes and longings [of the Antillians] in consider-
ation asyör as parciWe.
In the last three years subsequent Dutch state papers and the
minutes of parliamentary meetings elaborated on ways for the Nether-
lands Antilles and Aruba to enhance their autonomy and self-reliance.
The need for 'modernization' and 'professionalization' of public
management emerged as a recurring theme. One senses a growing
Dutch irritation over past and present performance of the Dutch
Caribbean public sector. The increase in quality of the public sector
is to be contrived by structural and long-standing assistance of Dutch
specialists. Implicitly, however, one could read in these proposals a
devastating comment on the policy of 'Antillianization' which has
been a guideline for all Antillian governments since the early 1970s.
This policy aimed at substituting Antillians for Dutch professionals
at all levels of both the public and the private sectors. Now, for the
Dutch policy makers, the pendulum apparently must swing back.
The change in Dutch policy has not primarily been inspired by
economic or strategic reasons. Where Antillian politicians perceived
continued Dutch presence as crucial, Dutch politicians may have
thought of these last remnants of empire as a nuisance, but at least
a minor one. An annual quarter of a billion Dutch guilders of devel-
opment aide is crucial from an Antillian perspective. It is not critical
to the Dutch. And while the migration outlet to the Netherlands may
be essential for Antillians, additional Antillian immigration for Dutch
policy makers is no welcome prospect, but neither is it a nightmare.
Thus Antillian politicians and the electorate, both firmly opposed to
independence, have benefitted from the very smallness of their
societies, which made it easier for the Dutch to stop pestering them
with the menace of unsolicited independence. In addition, the disillu-
sion in Suriname's post-independence record did much to sober those
who felt independence would provide the islands with a fresh impetus
to attain economic and political viability and self-reliance. Ironically
therefore, the Suriname debacle was a remote blessing for the Antil-
les. Finally, outside interests, particularly the US and Venezuela, may
have put a mounting pressure on the Dutch not to relinquish these
territories. The geopolitical risks of a power vacuum may have
inspired such pressure; and more recently, problems associated with
narcotrafficking and money-laundering have assumed major impor-
tance.
It is tempting to read 'recolonization' in these Dutch proposals. The
persuasive long-term prospect offered is that professionalization will
result in increased self-reliance and greater viability. Yet this prospect
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seems to be indeed long-term. Meanwhile Dutch assistance could put
mounting pressure on the Antillian and Arabian public sector. From
the Dutch perspective, it is justifiable that their Caribbean partners
pay for being 'allowed' to remain within the Kingdom by relinquish-
ing some of their previous autonomy. Growing Dutch involvement
will also extend to more 'assistance' in the legal system and the
administration of justice.
The Dutch are discontented over the previous decades of autono-
my in internal affairs. This growing discontent transpires in the
proposed regulations and restrictions on the autonomy of the Nether-
lands Antilles and Aruba, as put forward on the conferences on the
future of the Kingdom and the aide-memoire of Prime-minister
Lubbers of June 1993. Telling is the strong connection the Dutch are
making between 'good government' and a new Kingdomcharter.
Likewise, occasional allusions to the political culture of the islands,
the islands being on such a small-scale and therefore restricting the
scope for policy making by local politicians, may be read as a
suggestion that outside (Dutch) interference is needed to make things
work. In this regard, persistent rumors and indications of public
sector corruption, money-laundering and narcotrafficking in Sint
Maarten have now facilitated a Dutch involvement.
Higher supervision was imposed on Sint Maarten in mid-1992.
First based on an Interim Provision of the Council of Ministers of
the Kingdom and afterwards through the '/IMvflfl' (General Measure
of the Kingdom Government) for the duration of one year. This
Measure provided preventive supervision by the Governor on decrees
by an island organ, in case these decrees had considerable administra-
tive and financial implications. The Measure has been effective as
an instrument to prevent serious forms of undesirable government
acts, however it was not effective to improve the quality of adminis-
tration permanently. Actually the Sint-Maarten Government is not
considered capable of continuing the ongoing process of administrative
improvement on its own. A different provision with far-reaching
powers for a special Lieutenant Governor is contemplated for a period
of two years.*
One could conclude that Dutch patience with its partners has run out.
The Dutch and West-Indian political opinions on the issues of good
government and the restructuring of the Kingdom differ to a large
extent. But this does not mean that the Dutch wishes can be ignored
Rapport van de Commissie Evaluatie Hoger Toezicht Sint Maarten, januari 1994.
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much longer. This might have been a good strategy in the 1980s, but
another mood is prevailing in Dutch government and parliament. A
more successful strategy nowadays would be to negotiate the Dutch
demands. It also is of no use any longer to threaten the Dutch by
becoming independent, that is if the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
do not wish to become independent in the near future. The Dutch will
gladly grant full independence if the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba
so desire. In the past the Antillians could considerably influence the
Dutch policy to their advantage by using the argument of three
hundred years of colonial repression. That argument is now consid-
ered obsolete by the Dutch, as they do not want to accept that argu-
ment as an excuse for long-standing mismanagement of the public
sector.
If the Antillians and Arubians do not wish to negotiate, the
Dutch might very well impose unilateral restrictions on both West-
Indian partners of the Kingdom. Dutch MP's declared to be willing
to impose restrictions on the unlimited entrance of Antillians and
Arubians to the Netherlands. They also consider a cut-down in
development-aid to the Caribbean part of the Kingdom.
The question arises where this will place the former Netherlands
Antilles in the next decade? An educated guess points to the following
s c e n a r i o : .<• . : . - , ,-•-.;,.-,.. . •
independence is off; - , .- .
the former Dutch Antilles will further disintegrate, on the
modalities a hard battle will be fought, which might take more
t than ten years;
* the Dutch presence will be reconfirmed. • ••
Government policies and decisions with far reaching implications for
the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba must be made with the approval
of the population of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. It is essential
that the population approves of the policy of their representatives. The
referendum held on Curacao in November 1993 indicated a strong
preference of the population for an Antillian federation of the five
islands. This contradicted the political opinion on Curacao, which was
in favour of a separate status for the island. On the other islands a
referendum will be held in the near future, giving the population of
an island the possibility to voice their wishes on a new Antillian
constitutional relation. ^ vn;::;:-M;>;s vs>'•:> sr:•'.; • -"'•• ; ''
It is, however, conceivable that due to the outline of the Dutch
government the former unitary state of six islands of the Netherlands
Antilles will eventually split into at least three independent entities.
5S2 .
With independence postponed indefinitely and the formulation of a
new constitution of the Kingdom on its way, orientation of the Dutch
Caribbean islands to the metropolis is even more acute.'
A new Kingdom Charter is necessary as article 62 thereof stating
Aruba will become independent per January 1, 1996, has to be
eliminated, now that all parliaments concerned agreed to the amend-
ment of article 62 to that effect. The new Kingdom Charter will
certainly include heavy restrictions on financial mismanagement and
will support and implement the rule of law within the Kingdom. But
fü the islands will have every possibility to govern themselves. If they
will not comply with the guarantees of good government specified
in the Charter of the Kingdom the Kingdom itself will take over.
J.1 The conclusion of this study might be that constitutional problems rise
anew but that their causes lie in the past and that a constitutional past
casts long shadows. A lot can be learnt from that past so that costly
'• and painful (constitutional) misunderstandings might be anticipated,
''" as prevention is better than a powerless cure.
' The motto of the weapon of the Kingdom reads: 'Je maintien-
drai' (I will maintain). It applies to the Kingdom as a whole, nonethe-
-' less some caution is warranted or the motto might become: 'I will
'* a b a n d o n ' . . - < . - . ; • • ; » • . . , - = • - , . . . !.•....; .^  • , » . , > , . - . , .,:•. - • . ! • , , , <
'• Chapter IX analyses period IX (1986-1993) the present constitutional
'- position of the Kingdom with its predicaments and divines from the
•' past which political and constitutional dilemmas should be recognized,
•-' envisioned and settled. Chapter X presents suggestions for a new
Kingdom Charter on these pressing issues. These suggestions mainly
incorporate a different approach of the Kingdom Government in
•' Kingdom-matters and the implementation of higher supervision by
legislature of the Kingdom Government.
Whenever the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba neglects its respon-
sibilities or do not comply with Dutch indications for 'good govern-
ment' as stated in the Kingdom Charter, the higher organ will inform
the lower organ and a conference might be immediately convened to
• discuss the matter. The higher organ will invite the lower organ to
'•>• take certain necessary measures. If no agreement is reached on
' resolving the matter, any of the two parties can appeal to an indepen-
•'> dent Constitutional Court, which will have the right to issue binding
and final rulings and/or non-binding recommendations, for instance
Oostindie (1992).
a specially created branch of the Kingdom Government Advisory
Council (/toorf va/i Srate).
If after a specified period these conditions or the recommendations
or rulings of the Court are not observed the higher authority will
implement the required adjustments, resolutions or dispositions,
eventually by a General Measure of the Kingdom Government.
It is clear that the existing serious economic and financial
problems in the Dutch Caribbean will not correct themselves and that
imaginative and creative actions in problem solving and crisis man-
agement - a field in which the Dutch Caribbean lacks the necessary
experience - should be encouraged. Aruba and the Netherlands
Antilles believe that in order for these actions to have a certain degree
of success, clarity should exist on the future constitutional status of
the Dutch Caribbean. They deem clarity on this matter indispensable
in order to attain those instruments and conditions, such as invest-
ments and tranquility, to enable the construction of a solid foundation
for the future. The Netherlands are of a different opinion, they first
want structural adjustment reforms, before they are willing to contem-
plate a reform of the Kingdom Charter.
As the Netherlands only just began to realize that independence
could not be forced upon the Dutch Caribbean they never paid much
attention to supporting the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba in becom-
ing self-sufficient in governing their own territories. The existing
problems cannot be solved by imposing Dutch technical assistance
without including domestic talent and management. It does not answer
to substitute domestic management for expatriate management. The
necessary skills must be obtained from training domestic civil servants
and managers mainly in their own country, in order to achieve a real
civil service reform. Otherwise expatriate help might turn out to be
a destructive force instead of a constructive power. The challenge is
to keep safeguarding principles and the right of initiative and autono-
my of the Caribbean partners within the Kingdom at the same time,
and to respond to new positive developments in 'good government'
as well.'
When the new legal order for the Kingdom is conceived, the
Dutch Caribbean ought to be granted a more effective participation
and involvement in the government of the Kingdom. These adjust-
ments seem essential to counterbalance the increasing Dutch influence
in the Dutch Caribbean, ii n;X! v.;< \L.:m ^ ^<i' •> , V<-
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In the long run even a federation between the islands might become
possible again. The islands indeed have more in common which each
other than they have with the Netherlands proper. If the islands will
be able to perceive such a notion, they might see the profits of joining
forces and living together. This certainly does not mean that there
will suddenly be an ongoing honeymoon between the islands. But
there are advantages as the small scaleness of the islands will not
permit one island to survive on its own. So far an asymmetrical
federal structure did not meet with the approval of Aruba. In the
present Antillian constitutional system the smaller islands have a
political influence far beyond their relative importance. For their own
benefit the islands might learn to trust each other in the future, as it
is impossible nowadays for any country to live in splendid isolation.
The future seems hopeful as the referendum on Cura?ao indicated a
strong preference for an Antillian federation of the five islands.
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